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4. Conclusion 
 
We have evaluated the Coal Act against our traditional 
standards of proportionality and distaste for retroactivity, 
taking into account our deference to Congress on the evils 
to be addressed by the law. Ultimately, although the issue 
is close, we conclude that the Coal Act is targeted to 
address the problem of insufficient resources in the benefit 
funds and that it puts the burden on those who, in 
Congress's reasonable judgment, should bear it. The law's 
retroactivity is troubling, yet given the nature of the 
commitments at issue and the relationship of Coal Act 
liabilities to past acts in the industry, we cannot say that 
the Act violates due process. 
 
IV. Categorical Takings 
 
Unity and B&T also maintain that the Coal Act is an 
unconstitutional taking as applied to them. They ask us to 
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apply a categorical takings approach because, they claim, 
their businesses will be entirely destroyed if they have to 
pay benefits under the Act. In Eastern, the argument that 
the Coal Act would drive the plaintiff out of business 
entirely was not presented to the Court, and so the 
plaintiffs argue that they retain a viable takings claim. 
 
Five Justices, however, rejected the idea that a law that 
imposed only a financial burden without identifying a 
particular property right could ever consitute a taking. The 
fact that in a particular case a financial burden might 
consume all of a particular entity's assets would not seem 
to change Justice Kennedy's analysis: "The Coal Act neither 
targets a specific property interest nor depends upon any 
particular property for the operation of its statutory 
mechanisms." Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2156 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). Similarly, the dissent would require the 
governmental identification of "a specific interest in 
physical or intellectual property" in order tofind a 
compensable taking. Id. at 2161 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
The reasoning of these five Justices was that any 
governmental regulation that costs a business money could 
become a taking if the plurality's standards prevailed, and 
that this would be an unacceptable result. See id. at 2155 
(Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2162 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). This reasoning is unaffected by the 
characterization of the burden as a "total" taking because it 
consumes all of a particular company's resources. 
Moreover, even the plurality gave no indication that it 
would extend the categorical takings approach outside the 
context of regulations of real property. 
 
Because the Eastern Court was not confronted with this 
situation, however, we must set forth our reasons for 
rejecting it in greater detail. To date, the categorical 
approach has only been used in real property cases such as 
Lucas v. South Carolina, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). In those 
cases, the concept of "total destruction" of value refers not 
to the owner's total assets but to some identifiable property 
interest. Indeed, even a multi-billionaire would be eligible 
for an award under a categorical takings approach if some 
small, distinct parcel of his holdings were condemned or 
rendered worthless through regulation. Therefore, the "total 
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destruction" language of cases concerning real property 
should not be mechanically applied to the situation at bar. 
See Branch v. United States, 69 F.3d 1571, 1576-77 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) ("Because of `the State's traditionally high degree 
of control of commercial dealings,' the principles of takings 
law that apply to real property do not apply in the same 
manner to statutes imposing monetary liability." (quoting 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027)). 
 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the argument 
that a tax--even a tax on a small set of businesses--may 
violate due process or constitute a taking simply because it 
may force some of the regulated entities out of business: 
 
       The claim that a particular tax is so unreasonably high 
       and unduly burdensome as to deny due process is 
       both familiar and recurring, but the Court has 
       consistently refused either to undertake the task of 
       passing on the "reasonableness" of a tax that otherwise 
       is within the power of Congress or of state legislative 
       authorities, or to hold that a tax is unconstitutional 
       because it renders a business unprofitable. 
 
        . . . . The premise that a tax is invalid if so excessive 
       as to bring about the destruction of a particular 
       business, the Court said, had been "uniformly rejected 
       as furnishing no juridical ground for striking down a 
       taxing act." [Magano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40,] 47 
       [(1934)]. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 548, 19 
       L.Ed. 482 (1869); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 
       27, 24 S.Ct. 769, 49 L.Ed. 78 (1904); and Alaska Fish 
       Salting & By-Products Co. v. Smith, 255 U.S. 44, 41 
       S.Ct. 219, 65 L.Ed. 489 (1921), are to the same effect. 
 
        In Alaska Fish, a tax on the manufacture of certain 
       fish products was sustained, the Court saying, id., at 
       48-49, 41 S.Ct., at 220: "Even if the tax should destroy 
       a business it would not be made invalid or require 
       compensation upon that ground alone. Those who 
       enter upon a business take that risk. . . ." See also 
       International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Dept. of 
       Taxation, 322 U.S. 435, 444, 64 S.Ct. 1060, 1065, 88 
       L.Ed. 1373 (1944); Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 
       30, 42 S.Ct. 449, 66 L.Ed. 817 (1922); Brushaber v. 
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       Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 24, 36 S.Ct. 236, 244, 
       60 L.Ed. 493 (1916); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 
       107, 168-169, 31 S.Ct. 342, 356, 55 L.Ed. 389 (1911). 
 
City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369, 373- 
74 (1974). We note in this regard that we, along with other 
Courts of Appeals, have held that Coal Act obligations are 
taxes. See Lindsey Coal Mining Co. v. Chater, 90 F.3d 688, 
695 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding that the Act is "essentially a tax 
to continue a benefits program"). 
 
The plaintiffs respond that these taxation cases all 
concerned prospective, not retrospective, liability, but that 
argument conflates two separate issues. The size of the 
liability does not depend on whether or not the obligation is 
retrospective. If the argument is that the complete 
consumption of a company's assets is a categorical taking, 
retroactivity would be irrelevant; if such a law would only 
be a categorical taking when it was retroactive, then we are 
not really discussing a "categorical" taking. We think that 
retroactivity, while crucial to our due process analysis, is 
not properly considered as a part of the categorical takings 
analysis. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has also 
rejected the plaintiffs' argument, with reasoning wefind 
persuasive: 
 
       The constitutionality of the assessment should not 
       depend on the happenstance of the financial condition 
       of the assessed bank at the time of the assessment. We 
       are unaware of any principle of takings law under 
       which an imposition of liability is deemed a per se 
       taking as to any party that cannot pay it. It would be 
       perverse to hold that a statute resulting in a $99 
       million liability would be constitutional as applied to 
       any [entity] having a net worth of more than $100 
       million but unconstitutional per se as to any member 
       having a net worth of less than $100 million. The 
       assessment in both cases is based on the same theory 
       of liability and should meet the same constitutional 
       fate. 
 
Branch v. United States, 69 F.3d at 1577. 15 Branch 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. The plaintiffs dispute the Branch court's reasoning by citing to 
Lucas, 
in which the Court wrote: 
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recognizes that general regulatory laws, unlike the 
particularized applications of zoning regulations that are 
the typical targets of takings challenges, usually have the 
kind of general applicability that mutes the concerns 
behind takings jurisprudence. The broader the reach of a 
law, the less likely it is that a powerless segment of society 
is being unfairly singled out to bear a burden that society 
as a whole should bear.16 
 
As the concurrence and the dissent in Eastern suggest, 
considerable practical problems would arise were we to find 
plaintiffs' categorical takings claim cognizable. For example, 
we would have to decide at what point we could justify 
granting relief on these grounds. Unity will go out of 
business as soon as it is ordered to pay. B&T, by contrast, 
will apparently go under in two years, when its liabilities 
under the Act consume the last of its reserves. Should we 
wait until B&T is in the same position as Unity? Would 
being a year away from bankruptcy be enough? Should 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       It is true that at least in some cases the landowner with 95% loss 
       will get nothing, while the landowner with total loss will recover 
in 
       full. But that occasional result is no more strange than the gross 
       disparity between the landowner whose premises are taken for a 
       highway (who recovers in full) and the landowner whose property is 
       reduced to 5% of its former value by the highway (who recovers 
       nothing). Takings law is full of these "all-or-nothing" situations. 
 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8. However, Lucas is inapposite. In Lucas, 
there was a strip of affected beachfront land; that land was reduced to 
zero value by regulation; that was a taking. The Court did not inquire 
into whether the landowners had enough other resources to survive the 
reduction in value, because that was not relevant to the test. All that 
was necessary was to look at the value of the affected land. Under the 
plaintiffs' interpretation, the Court should have examined Mr. Lucas's 
financial condition before and after the regulation at issue, and there 
would not have been a categorical taking if Mr. Lucas remained in the 
black. This suggests the difficulties with a takings analysis that is 
unanchored to a specific property interest. 
 
16. Breadth of application has its own dangers, however, and one of 
those dangers is that a law will have irrationally large effects on 
regulated businesses. Our substantive due process jurisprudence has 
developed to address this situation, as we discuss supra in Section III. 
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B&T be required to show that there is no potential"white 
knight" that might rescue it from destruction? Alternatively, 
we might reduce B&T's obligations instead of eliminating 
them entirely so that it could limp along, never showing a 
profit but never going under. That would arguably be an 
appropriate, constitutional remedy for the threatened harm, 
the way that transferable use credits can mitigate what 
would otherwise be a taking when zoning restrictions are at 
issue. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 
438 U.S. 104 (1978). If it is the total destruction of the 
business that converts the Act into a taking, then perhaps 
we should simply declare that part of the obligation that 
will drive B&T out of business a taking and approve the 
rest. Yet this would only plunge courts further into the 
intricacies of business finance. 
 
Deciding for Unity and B&T because they will be forced 
into bankruptcy by the Coal Act would open up a Pandora's 
Box that would throw into question every economic 
regulation imaginable. Companies could adjust their 
accounting practices to prove that any particular regulation 
would be enough to destroy them as profitable enterprises. 
The problem would be compounded if, as counsel for 
plaintiffs suggested at oral argument, we should evaluate 
the financial status of an entity without looking at its 
corporate relatives for takings purposes. A corporation 
subject to expensive regulation at some of its production 
facilities could create a series of subsidiaries, each of which 
would be insolvent on its own if forced to comply with a 
particular set of regulations, and claim constitutional 
protection against enforcement of the regulations, even 
though a different corporate configuration would remain 
solvent.17 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. A supporting in terrorem argument is not difficult to devise. For 
example, an employer could resist an increase in the minimum wage on 
the ground that the increased cost would drive it out of business. 
Similarly, many small-business owners find that anti-discrimination laws 
generate significant expenses, and some might be forced out of business 
by compliance costs. See Mike Hudson, Jobs for Disabled People: 
Handicapping Businesses, Roanoke Times & World News, July 30, 1995, 
at F1. While such concerns might very well prove overstated in most 
cases, courts would be forced into the dismal business of economic 
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A decision on these grounds would also open the door to 
plaintiffs attempting to choose government regulations from 
which they wanted to be excused. It is notable that B&T 
repeatedly discusses its other expensive government- 
imposed obligations, which involve cleaning up polluted 
coal mines and paying out black lung benefits. The Coal Act 
alone, according to B&T's submissions, would not 
necessarily put B&T out of business; it is only because the 
environmental and black lung obligations are so large that 
this additional expense overwhelms B&T. There is nothing 
in B&T's constitutional argument about "total takings" that 
distinguishes its other obligations from those imposed by 
the Coal Act, nor is there a conceptual reason to confine 
this definition of total takings to retroactive laws. 
 
We decline to enter into the conceptual morass that 
would be engendered by the plaintiffs' total takings theory. 
That a regulation will put a particular plaintiff out of 
business cannot be proof that a taking has occurred. 
Instead, the size of the deprivation inflicted by a law must 
be evaluated in the context of the other relevant facts. In 
Connolly, the Court noted that the MPPAA "completely 
deprives an employer of whatever amount of money it is 
obligated to pay to fulfill its statutory liability." Connolly, 
475 U.S. at 225. But this did not lead to the conclusion 
that there had been a taking because "[t]here is nothing to 
show that the withdrawal liability actually imposed on an 
employer will always be out of proportion to its experience 
with the plan, and the mere fact that the employer must 
pay money to comply with the Act is but a necessary 
consequence of the MPPAA's regulatory scheme." Id. at 226. 
 
We do not gainsay that the liability imposed on Unity in 
particular is troubling. Unity's assets are tiny, and its Coal 
Act liabilities dwarf them. If we uphold the defendants' 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
prediction. Every economic regulation would have to be litigated on a 
case-by-case basis. See Sheila A. Moloney, The Lady in Red Tape, Policy 
Review, Sept./Oct. 1996, at 48 (discussing various regulations that 
threaten the financial viability of specific businesses, including OSHA 
safety regulations, FTC franchising rules, ADA accessibility 
requirements, Endangered Species Act development restrictions, and 
EPA Superfund clean-up costs). 
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position, this small family business will be bankrupted 
instantly. But the size of a liability only weighs in favor of 
finding a taking insofar as it is out of proportion to the 
legitimate obligations society may impose on individual 
entities. And, as we have discussed in Part III, wefind the 
proportionality test satisfied in this instance. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
We hold that Congress could reasonably determine that 
the plaintiffs, along with other coal operatiors in similar 
situations, placed the coal industry retiree benefit funds in 
jeopardy after creating an expectation of lifetime benefits. 
Moreover, the actions that created the need for the Coal Act 
are not so far in the past as to make it fundamentally 
unjust to impose liability upon the plaintiffs, because the 
burden is proportional to their contribution to the problem 
and the retroactivity is not too extensive. We do not deny 
that Unity, in particular, presents a sympathetic case. This 
family business has slowly decreased in size as the 
economic changes of the past decades have buffeted it. Yet 
small businesses, even businesses that have suffered from 
the eroding pressures of time and economic change, cannot 
be immune from reasonable government regulation simply 
because that regulation has harsh effects. The Coal Act 
may not be an ideal law; it may not even be a wise one. But 
its wisdom, or lack thereof, in a particular case does not 
determine its constitutionality. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court will be affirmed. 
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ALDISERT, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
I agree with the majority's determination that the 1992 
Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act, 26 U.S.C. 
SS 9701-9722 (1994 and Supp II) ("Coal Act"), as applied to 
Unity Real Estate Company and Barnes and Tucker 
Company does not violate substantive due process and is 
not an unconstitutional taking. I agree also that the 
retroactive scope of the Act is not beyond appropriate 
legislative power. 
 
Although Appellants vigorously contend that their cases 
are analogous to Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 
2131 (1998), their analogical argument fails because the 
decisive material facts of the cases bear no similarity. The 
decisive material facts in Eastern Enterprises are that the 
company (1) left the coal industry in 1965 and (2) was 
never a party to the 1974 and later Wage Agreements that 
first suggested the commitment to lifetime benefits for 
retirees and family members. See Eastern Enterprises, 118 
S. Ct. at 2150 (plurality opinion). Unlike the former coal 
operator in Eastern Enterprises, Appellants remained in the 
coal industry until 1981 and 1984 respectively, and 
participated in negotiations for the 1974 and later Wage 
Agreements. As emphasized in Eastern Enterprises, "It is 
the 1974, 1978 and subsequent agreements that first 
suggest an industry commitment to the funding of lifetime 
health benefits for both retirees and their family members." 
Id. Appellants' act of signing the 1974 and subsequent 
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements (NBCWA or 
"Wage Agreement") precludes the rote application of Eastern 
Enterprises to these cases. 
 
I. 
 
On the due process question of "promises" and 
"representations" made to the miners, I would sustain the 
constitutionality of the Act as applied to the Appellants for 
one reason only: The evidence before Congress provided a 
rational basis to believe that a promise of lifetime benefits 
had been made. Congress relied on the Coal Commission 
Report, its appendices and the Commissioners' testimony at 
the Senate hearing. For example, the Coal Commission 
Report stated: 
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       The Commission firmly believes that retired miners are 
       entitled to the health care benefits that were promised 
       and guaranteed them and that such commitments 
       must be honored. . . . 
 
       Retired coal miners have legitimate expectations of 
       health care benefits for life; that was the promise they 
       received during their working lives and that is how 
       they planned their retirement years. That commitment 
       should be honored. 
 
See Supp. App. at 350, 360 (Secretary of Labor's Advisory 
Commission on United Mine Workers of America Retiree 
Health Benefits, Coal Commission Report (1990)). These 
were important findings that were accepted by Congress. 
 
Whether the Commission Report accurately portrayed the 
state of affairs in the coal mining industry at the time the 
1974 Wage Agreement was negotiated and signed is largely 
irrelevant to what should be our analysis of the Coal Act's 
constitutionality. In considering the question of who 
promised what to whom, I do not believe that it is 
appropriate for any reviewing court to review de novo the 
history of the agreements or to parse their language. 
 
I say this because, to paraphrase Holmes, "That's not our 
job."1 Once we get beyond that portion of the Due Process 
or Takings Clause analysis relating to the Coal Act's 
financial effect on the Appellants, we must address whether 
there was deprivation of property without due process of 
law on the theory that the Appellants never promised any 
benefits beyond the lifetime of the Wage Agreements. Our 
job is not to examine the materials and to make an 
independent determination of this issue, a sort of ersatz 
fact-finding by either a federal trial or appellate court. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Learned Hand once reminisced: "I remember once I was with [Holmes]; 
it was a Saturday when the Court was to confer. It was before we had 
a motor car, and we jogged along in an old coup). When we got to the 
Capitol, I wanted to provoke a response, so as he walked off, I said to 
him: `Well, sir, goodbye. Do justice!' . . . He replied: `That is not my 
job. 
My job is to play the game according to the rules.' " Learned Hand, 
Continuing Legal Education for Professional Competence and 
Responsibility, Report on the Arden House Conference, at 116-123 
(1958). 
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On this issue, as I see it, our job is merely to determine 
whether substantial evidence was presented before 
Congress on this issue. And I conclude that there was. The 
Coal Commission Report and other testimony before the 
Senate Committee informed Congress that "[r]etired coal 
miners have legitimate expectations of health care benefits 
for life; that was the promise they received during their 
working lives and that is how they planned their retirement 
years. That commitment should be honored." Supp. App. at 
360 (Secretary of Labor's Advisory Commission on United 
Mine Workers of America Retiree Health Benefits, Coal 
Commission Report (1990)). This determination serves as 
the rational basis for the legislation. 
 
Our sole obligation is "to assure that, in formulating its 
judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable inferences 
based on substantial evidence." Turner Broadcasting Sys. 
Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 520 U.S. 180, 195 
(1997) (internal quotations omitted). Substantial evidence 
"does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, 
but rather `such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' " Pierce 
v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (quoting 
Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). "We owe Congress'findings 
deference in part because the institution is far better 
equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast 
amounts of data bearing upon legislative questions." 
Turner, 520 U.S. at 195 (internal quotations omitted). On 
the basis of the record before Congress, I would conclude 
that there was substantial evidence to provide Congress 
with a rational basis for believing that the Coal Act was 
consistent with promises that had been made by coal 
operators to their former employees. 
 
II. 
 
Important prudential considerations undergird the 
Court's limitations on the judicial role. In the case at bar, 
reasonable persons can differ in evaluating the history of 
the critical Wage Agreements and interpreting its 
provisions. For example, although the majority has made a 
thorough and scholarly analysis of these circumstances, my 
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own conclusions would be somewhat different. I would not 
rely on promises and representations made apparently 
dehors the explicit language of the Wage Agreements. 
 
Critical to me is that the Wage Agreements expressly 
limited all of the promised retiree health benefits to the 
term of each agreement. Miners who retired after 1975, but 
whose former employers were no longer in the coal mining 
business, were promised benefits through the United Mine 
Workers of America 1974 Benefit Plan and Trust ("1974 
Plan"). See Eastern Enterprises, 118 S. Ct. at 2139-2140. 
Article XX(c)(3)(ii) of the NBCWA stated that the purpose of 
the 1974 Plan was to provide employee health benefits only 
"during the term of this Agreement." Similarly, Article II of 
the 1974 Plan expressly stated that if the plan assets were 
to "become insufficient" to continue providing benefits after 
the NBCWA had expired, "the benefits may be suspended or 
reduced to amounts which, in the judgment of the 
Trustees, can be paid from the net assets." The NBCWA 
contained a "General Description" of all promised benefits 
that expressly stated that health benefits were"guaranteed" 
at fixed levels only "during the term of this Agreement." 
Similar provisions are found or incorporated in other 
agreements. I simply can find no evidence of any"promise" 
of lifetime benefits contained in any Wage Agreement. Any 
reliance on extra-contractual "promises" looks to a novel 
theory of law that turns a blind eye to the centuries-old law 
of contracts and to the current law on collective bargaining 
agreements. 
 
To suggest that the clear language limiting benefits to the 
term of the Wage Agreement is trumped by the "lifetime" 
health card is a stretch.2 By analogy, one could say that 
possession of a Social Security card "for life," without more 
and without any proof of disability, entitles one to benefits. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The basis for the claim of a "lifetime" health card is in the "General 
Description" of the 1974 NBCWA, which states: 
 
       Any pensioned miner covered in this Plan will retain his Health 
       Services card until death, and upon his death his widow will retain 
       a health Services card until her death or remarriage. 
 
See Appellants' Supp. Br. at 6-7. 
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The "evergreen" clauses included in the 1978 Wage 
Agreement do not persuade me to reach a different result: 
My reading of these clauses is that they addressed only 
employer funding, not the scope of the underlying employee 
benefits. 
 
As a native of Carnegie, Pennsylvania--a coal mining and 
steel mill town near Pittsburgh--who is old enough to 
remember the organizational efforts of John L. Lewis in the 
coal fields in the 1930s and the 1947 Krug-Lewis 
Agreement, I no doubt have a unique perspective. I know 
first-hand the mantra of every coal miner through decades 
of strikes and picketing: "No Contract, No Work." 
 
To the miner, the actual contract controlled, not the 
expectation of future agreements. Without the contract in 
hand, the miners would not pick up their lamps at the 
lamp house and descend into the shafts. They worked 
under the precise language in a given contract and under 
no other representations. The sordid history of the coal 
company towns that surrounded Carnegie, and the 
inhumane treatment of the miners and their families prior 
to effective unionization in the mines, impelled the miners 
to require thereafter that every representation of working 
conditions and benefits be set forth in clear language in a 
hard-fought written collective bargaining agreement. 
 
The foregoing discussion is but my gratuitous 
interpretation of some of the history and contents of the 
Wage Agreements, and admittedly, it may be contrary to 
that expressed in most other judicial opinions. My views 
and those of judges with contrary interpretations are 
important in one respect only: My views and those of other 
judges are totally irrelevant. What is relevant is only that on 
the basis of evidence before it, Congress concluded that a 
promise of lifetime benefits had been made. This furnished 
the rational basis for enacting the controversial provisions 
of the Coal Act. 
 
III. 
 
This, too, must be said. I am conscious that in light of 
the view that we take here, the handwriting is on the wall 
that a kind of hydraulic pressure will generate economic 
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disasters in companies whose financial circumstances are 
similar to Unity and Barnes and Tucker. Without additional 
and more realistic Congressional intervention, we may see 
a phenomenon of the "last man standing," as companies 
disappear from the economic scene and responsibility for 
paying benefits shifts to surviving companies. If this case is 
any example and a forerunner of things to come, the 
operation of the present statutory solution to the vexing 
health benefit problem of retirees and their dependents may 
serve as a full employment program for bankruptcy lawyers 
of companies unable to make prescribed payments. Sadly, 
I do not believe that this statement is an argumentum ad 
terrorem. 
 
I join in the judgment of the court. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                59 
